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I. INTRODUCTION'
For the last twenty years, much of the discussion about the criminal
justice system has focused on criminal sentencing. Prior to 1970, the states
and the federal government used indeterminate sentencing, a method whereby
judges and parole boards exercised a great deal of discretion over the length
of criminal sentences. Since 1970, many states and the federal government
have shifted to determinate sentencing. Determinate sentencing is appealing
because it offers truth in sentencing, which means the sentence that the judge
gives is actually served. In addition, determinate sentencing creates uniformity
and proportionality in sentencing. Sentencing guidelines are a popular
manifestation of determinate sentencing.
This Article discusses the reasons why sentencing guidelines are the best
way to achieve proportionality and uniformity in the sentencing of criminal
offenders. Sentencing guidelines have been implemented in a number of states
and the federal system, and, thus, the successes and failures of those reforms
offer lessons for future reforms of criminal justice sentencing systems. The
Article examines presumptive sentencing and sentencing guidelines in detail
and explains those factors that should be considered when establishing
sentencing guidelines. The final section of the Article analyzes the experiences of states and the federal courts with senteicing guidelines in an effort to
show how their experiences can be applied in other states.
II. THE TREND TOWARD DETERMINATE SENTENCING
For nearly two hundred years, indeterminate sentencing was the
predominant form of sentencing in the United States. Under indeterminate
sentencing, legislatures establish very broad policies by creating statements of
purpose, by establishing maximum sentences (often without corresponding
minimums) and by authorizing general sentencing procedures. Judges and
parole boards have vast discretion in determining the appropriate amount and
type of punishment for each offender. The underlying purpose of this scheme
is to incarcerate the offender until he or she has become rehabilitated.2
Accordingly, the length of incarceration depends more on the characteristics
of the individual offender than on the nature of the crime.3 In addition,
disparity in sentence length for individuals convicted of the same crime is an
accepted part of the system of individualized treatment for offenders.4 For
many years indeterminate system satisfied the needs of those involved with the
criminal justice system. Liberals were pleased with the rejection of the notion

1. The author wishes to thank the Honorable John Cratsley, Justice of the Massachusetts
Superior Court and Lecturer of Law, Harvard Law School, for his helpful comments on
earlier drafts of this Article.
2. Susan E. Martin, Interests and Politics in Sentencing Reform: The Development of
Sentencing Guidelines in Minnesota and Pennsylvania, 29 VIIL. L. REv. 21, 25-26 (1984).
3. MARTIN L. FORST, SENTENCING REFORM: EXPERIMENTs IN REDUCING DISPARITY 17
(1982). See also DAvID J. RoTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE 56-72 (1980).
4. FORST, supra note 3, at 17.
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of retribution as well as the possibility of speedy release for offenders
amenable to rehabilitation; judges enjoyed vast discretion but were relieved of
the responsibility for release decisions; prison administrators had flexibility in
controlling hostile inmates; and politicians could appear "tough on crime" by
raising statutory penalties without affecting prison population or the actual
time served.'
In the early 1970s, support for indeterminate sentencing began to
crumble. Civil libertarian groups initiated the attack, claiming that the system
was based on inadequate and biased assumptions to predict future behavior,
and that judges and parole boards had unchecked discretion.' In addition, the
perception that crime rates were out of control led some officials to demand
surer and stiffer sanctions against criminals as a means of preventing crime.7
While these two groups disagreed about the appropriate sanction for
individual offenders, they both believed that more explicit standards would
structure the discretion of officials and reduce disparity in the length of
sentences.8 The call for uniformity was furthered by empirical evidence
showing that different sentences were imposed on defendants who. had
committed similar offenses.'
A change in sentencing philosophy accompanied the demand for reform.
The sentencing purposes of legislators shifted from an emphasis on utilitarian
aims, particularly treatment, toward a greater focus on deserved punishment,
on the proportionality of sanctions to harms done, and on equity." This shift
in philosophy reflects a shift from rehabilitation as the main goal of sentencing
to retribution or "just deserts" as the core theory underlying sentencing.
Rehabilitation refers to the effects of a sentence or other treatment on
changing the behavior of the convicted offender subsequent to release.
Because rehabilitation was the goal of the criminal justice system, sentencing
methods favored discretion at both the front end with the judge and at the
back end with the parole board. This discretion allowed the judge to
determine the maximum amount of time necessary for rehabilitation, and the
parole board could decide when rehabilitation had been completed." For
years a commitment to rehabilitation was the dominate force shaping
sentencing policy.

5. Sheldon L. Messinger & Phillip D. Johnson, California's Determinate Sentencing
Statute: History and Issues,NAT'L INST. OF LAW ENFORCEMENT & CRIMINAL JUSTICE, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DETERMINATE SENTENCING: REFORM OR REGRESSION? 16-17 (1978).
6. MARVIN F. FRANC EL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHouT ORDER 86-102 (1973).
7. See generally JAMES Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME (rev. ed. 1983).
8. RICHARD G. SINGER, JUST DESERTS: SENTENCING BASED ON EQUALITY AND DESERT
10 (1979).
9. Norval Morris & Michael Tonry, Presidingin Criminal Court: An Introduction, 72
JUDICATURE 7, 9-10 (1988).

10. See Frederick A. Hussey & Stephen P. Lagoy, The Impact of DeterminateSentencing
Structures, 17 CraM. L. BULL. 197 (1981).
11. Alfred Blumstein, Sentencing Reforms: Impacts and Implications, 68 JUDICATURE
129, 130-31 (1984).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1992

3

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 57, Iss. 4 [1992], Art. 1

1080

0MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57

The predominant view today is that rehabilitation fails and should not be
the goal of sentencing. 2 Evidence eventually showed that recidivism was
unaffectedby rehabilitation programs. Harvard University criminologist James
Q. Wilson examined over a hundred studies on the effect of treatment
programs and concluded that the "evidence supporting the efficacy of
correctional treatment is slight, inconsistent and of questionable reliability."'
The United States Senate, in its report on the Comprehensive Crime Control
Act of 1984, declared that the rehabilitation theory underlying indeterminate
sentencing simply had not worked and was not "an appropriate basis for
sentencing decisions."' 4
The declared purposes of sentencing reform reflect this move, to
retribution as the dominant sentencing goal. For example, a Senate Judiciary
Committee report declared in 1984, "This purpose-essentially the 'just
deserts' concept-should be reflected clearly in all sentences; it is another way
of saying that the sentence [should] reflect the gravity of the defendant's
conduct."'" Retribution requires proportional punishment, that is, punishment
proportional to the crime. The moral judgment of blameworthiness must be
translated into a sentence for each particular crime. Public outrage over the
increasing crime rate often leads to the use of retribution as a justification for
punishment. As Baltimore Circuit Court Judge Marshall Levin, chairperson
of the Maryland Sentencing Guidelines Board, said, "Judges are sentencing to
prison more, longer and avowedly for purposes of retribution. They seem to
do so partly out of response to public outrage over crime and partly because
of their own concem and frustration about increasing crime."' Judge Levin
explained that retribution is justified: "I think sometimes the sentence must
reflect the public outcry over crime and the way it was committed. Some
crimes and the manner of their commission cry out for retribution." 7
Courts and legislators have also commented on this movement toward
retribution. The California Supreme Court stated that "the purposes of
imprisonment [under the old system] were deterrence, isolation and rehabilitation .... Not the least of these was rehabilitation.. . . The [new law] marked
a significant change in the penal philosophy of this state regarding adult
offenders."' 8 Legislators' views are reflected in the purposes they put forth
in sentencing reform bills. For example, the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines
Commission, established by the state legislature, declared flatly that retribution
had finally become "the primary sentencing goal."' 9 Pennsylvania did not

12. WILSON, supranote 7, at 162. See also CHARLES E. SILBERMAN, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE,
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 372-74 (1978).

13.
14.
3223.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

WILSON, supra note 7, at 162-67.
S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984), reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182,
J.S. Bainbridge Jr., The Return of Retribution, A.B.A. J., May 1985, at 60, 62.
Id.
Id.
In re Eric J., 601 P.2d 549, 553-54 (Cal. 1979) (citations omitted).
Bainbridge, supra note 15, at 63.
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go that far, but instead has adopted an approach that includes a variety of
considerations: retribution as well as rehabilitation. 0
This shift from rehabilitation toward retribution underlies the shift from
indeterminate sentencing toward determinate sentencing. Over the last decade
the trend has led to larger and more sweeping reform with more states and the
federal government adopting presumptive sentencing or sentencing guidelines.
III. DEFINITIONS
In order to clarify the terms used when describing sentencing systems,
some definitions should be provided. The definitions are taken from the
2
Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) Bulletin entitled Setting Prison Terms. '
The advantage of these definitions is that they treat "determinateness" and
"mandatoriness" as separate issues. Thus, the analysis is divided into two
parts:
sentencing structures that limit post-sentencing discretion and
sentencing structures that limit judicial discretion.

20. Id.
21. Bureau of Justice Statistics, Setting Prison Terms, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS
BULL. 1 (1983). These definitions were also used in a report about New York sentencing
reform. See BRUCE C. FREDERICK ET AL., NEW YORK STATE DivisIoN OF CRIM. JUSTICE
SERVS., THE EFFECTS OF LfrriNG DISCRETION IN SENTENCING (1984).
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imposed by a judge
constrains post-sentencing discretion,
the more "determinate" the sentence.
A totally indeterminate system is one
in which the sentence specifies that

f.

Figure 1

the defendant is to
be incarcerated, but
the term of incarceration and the length of time under parole supervision are
left to the discretion of correction officials. At the opposite end, the totally
determinate system would be one in which the sentence imposed by a judge
specifies the precise length of incarceration and the time under parole
supervision. Most states have adopted systems that allow intermediate degrees
of post-sentencing discretion. Figure 1 above shows the different degrees of

post-sentencing discretion.'

22. BRUCE C. FREDERICK ET AL., supra note 21, at 14. The definitions used in the chart
are as follows:
ParoleGuidelines-Paroleguidelines are procedures and standardized criteria to be used
by a parole board in determining the length of time that an offender should remain in prison.
Criteria typically include measures of offense seriousness, criminal history, and institutional
behavior. Parole guidelines can generally be used in conjunction with min/max sentencing, but
are incompatible with determinate sentencing, for which post-sentencing discretion regarding
sentence lengths is definitionally excluded.
Min/max Sentencing--Minmax sentencing is a system wherein the court specifies a
minimum and maximum term of incarceration, but the parole board determines the actual release
date, within the limits of the court imposed sentence. The degree to which a min/max sentence
limits post-sentencing discretion depends on the specified range. If the minimum is "zero" and
the maximum is "life," the sentence is totally indeterminate. If the minimum equals the
maximum, the sentence is "determinate." Systems vary as to whether "good time" may be
deducted from the minimum, the maximum, or both.
Fixed Sentencing-The term "fixed sentencing" is used differently in different states. A
definition that encompasses all these usages views fixed sentencing as a special case ofminlinax
sentencing. Only a single term is specified by the court, but it is treated as a maximum period
of incarceration for which an associated minimum is automatically implied. The implied
minimum is equal to the maximum in determinate systems, but for an indeterminate system it
might be "zero" for all sentences, one year for all sentences, or some constant fraction of the
maximum (e.g., 1/3): Not all fixed sentences are determinate, but all determinate sentences are
fixed.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol57/iss4/1
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Structures that
limit judicial discreThe Range of Judicial Discretion
tion explain the
degree to which
presumptveness of Structure
sentences are "mandatory." Discretion
may be unfettered,
with sentencing
made
decisions
solely by a judge, or
there may be no
=,8,k.8"1.
discretion at all,
3.
when sentences are
fixed by statute. In
practice, most states
Figure 2
have mandatory
provisions for some
categories of offenses or offenders and then permit judges more discretion in cases outside of the
targeted categories.' Figure 2 above explains this discretion. 24 The terms

Determinate Sentencing-Determinate sentencing is a system in which the court specifies
a fixed term of incarceration that must be served in full (minus good time). The influence of
correctional authorities on actual time served in prison is limited to awarding (or revoking) good
time credits on the basis of institutional behavior; there is no discretionary parole release.
Bureau of Justice Statistics, supra note 21, at 2.
23. See RICHARD S. MORELLI, A SURVEY OF MANDATORY SENTENCING IN THE U.S.: A
SUMMARY AND BRIEF ANALYSIS OF MANDATORY SENTENCING PRACTICES IN THE UNITED

STATES (1981).
24. BRUCE C. FREDERICK ET AL., supra note 21, at 18. The diagram uses the following
terms:
StatutoryLimits-Inmost states the legislature has placed constraints on judicial discretion
by establishing upper limits, lower limits, or rangesfor each offense. The court may not impose
terms of incarceration that are shorter than specified by the lower limits or longer than specified
by the upper limits. The limits could apply to the fixed terms in a determinate system; they
could apply to the fixed terms, maximum terms, or minimum terms in an indeterminate system.
Statutory lower limits on terms of incarceration do not necessarily imply mandatory incarceration; the court may have the discretion to impose either a non-incarcerative sentence or an
incarermtive sentence within the allowable range.
MandatorySentences-Mandatorysentencing involves a minimum incarcerative sentence
that must be imposed for certain crimes or categories of offenders, without an option for
probation, suspended sentence, or immediate parole eligibility. Mandatory provisions can apply
to the "in/out" determination, the minimum term, the maximum term, or some combination of
these. Mandatory provisions can be incorporated into both determinate and indeterminate
systems.
Presumptive Sentencing-In some states, judges' decisions are constrained by a
legislatively established "presumptive" sentence. It is presumed that a specific sentence identified
by statute (e.g., a determinate sentence of three years minus good time for house burglary) will
be the sentence imposed in all unexceptional cases. If mitigating or aggravating circumstances
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presumptive sentencing and sentencing guidelines are often used interchangeably. The difference established here is that sentencing guidelines allow a
judge to depart with written reasons, while presumptive sentencing only allows
mitigating or aggravating circumstances to change the presumptive sentences.
This difference is really a matter of degree because different states have
different departure standards that may fall in between these two definitions.
In addition, presumptive sentencing is established by the legislature, while
sentencing guidelines can be established by the legislature or a commission.
The analysis in this Article would apply to both types of determinate
sentencing.

IV. THE FUTURE OF SENTENCING REFORM
States considering sentencing reform generally choose to enact either
mandatory minimum sentences or sentencing guidelines. Mandatory minimum
sentencing dramatically limits judicial discretion. Because sentencing
discretion is almost completely taken away from the judge, judges generally
disfavor mandatory minimum sentencing even more than presumptive or
guideline sentencing. For example, when the sentencing guideline bill was
being discussed in the Pennsylvania legislature, there were other bills filed that
would have established mandatory minimum sentences.25 Thus, while some
judges were not truly in favor of sentencing guidelines, they felt that the
guidelines were better than the mandatory minimum sentencing bills, which
might have been passed had the guidelines failed. Mandatory minimum
sentences tend to "put cuffs on the judges."2 6 With such minimums, judges
cannot give shorter sentences than those imposed by the legislature. With

exist, the sentence usually may be lengthened or shortened within specific boundaries, but a
judge cannot impose a prison sentence outside the specified range. Presumptive sentencing is
similar to mandatory sentencing in that the sentencing prescriptions carry the force of law. It
differs from mandatory sentencing in that presumptive sentencing provides explicit procedures
for exceptional handling of legitimately exceptional cases.
Sentencing Guidelines-Sentencingguidelines can be implemented through legislation,
judicial decree or by voluntary judicial adoption. Guidelines generally specify a narrow range
of sentencing options from which a specific sentence is to be selected for unexceptional cases.
The range of sentences specified is typically determined by the seriousness of the offense, the
offender's criminal history, prevailing sentencing practices, or various combinations of these
elements. Compliance with guidelines may be voluntary or presumptive. "Descriptive
guidelines" merely provide empirical information about past practice in the hope that judges will
examine more carefully their justification for sentences that depart drastically from the norm.
Alternatively, guidelines may be prescriptive andpresumptive, holding judges strictly accountable
for sentences outside the specified ranges. For example, judges may be required to justify
exceptional sentences in writing, or such sentences may be subject to automatic appellate review.
Bureau of Justice Statistics, supra note 21, at 4.
25. See generally Louis B. Schwartz, Options in Constructinga Sentencing System:
Sentencing Guidelines Under Legislative or JudicialHegemony, 67 VA. L. REv. 637 (1981).
26. Interviewwith MaryLou Szulborski, Executive Director ofthe Massachusetts Committee
for Criminal Justice and former member of the Governor's Legal Office, in Boston, Mass. (Mar.
23, 1990).
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guideline sentencing, judges can go outside of the presumed range as long as
they record their reasons.
In addition, guideline sentencing reforms the entire criminal sentencing
system, while mandatory minimums tend to reform one offense at a time.
Although mandatory minimum sentencing would face strong judicial
opposition, it is attractive to politicians, who can tell their constituents that
they are "tough on crime" and have imposed mandatory minimum sentences.
Guideline sentencing provides the most promising and broadest reform
of a criminal sentencing system. Because guideline sentencing is the most
comprehensive way to deal with all aspects of criminal sentencing, the
remainder of this Article examines guideline sentencing. This examination
will explain many issues that jurisdictions must consider in order to adopt
effective sentencing guidelines. Because guidelines affect many different
crimes, care and time must be devoted to their development. This Article
should provide legislators or guideline commissions with a start on that
process.
First, in order to present some examples of the type of reform this Article
addresses, an explanation of sentencing guidelines systems, which have been
adopted in states and the federal system, is provided. Next, the Article
explores the issues which must be considered when drafting guidelines.
Finally, the Article examines the effects of sentencing guidelines in an attempt
to draw some conclusions about whether a state should follow the lead of
other states and the federal system and adopt wholesale sentencing reform.
V. EXAMPLES OF DETERMINATE SENTENCING
In 1983 the Bureau of Justice Statistics classified sentencing structures as
"determinate" in nine states.27 Since then, several more states, such as
Maryland," Florida,29 New York,30 District of Columbia,3 ' and the federal system," have joined the original group of nine. The sentencing structures
of these jurisdictions vary; a few of them will be briefly explained.
A legislatively established program was set up in North Carolina. The
Fair Sentencing Act created sentencing guidelines; it required judges to either

27. Bureau of Justice Statistics, supranote 21, at 6. The states with determinate sentencing
were California, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Minnesota, New Mexico, and
North Carolina. See supranotes 22, 24 for definitions used by the Bureau of Justice Statistics.
28. See Marshall A. Levin, Maryland'sSentencing Guidelines-A System by andforJudges,
68 JUDICATURE 172 (1984).
29. See Leonard Holton, What Is to Be Done with Sentencing Guidelines?, 1987 FLA. B.J.
19 (1987).
30. See FREDERICK ET AL., supra note 21.
31. See Kay A. Knapp, StructuredSentencing: Building on Experience,72 JUDICATURE 46

(1988).
32. See Janet Alberghini, Comment, Structuring Determinate Sentencing Guidelines:
Difficult Choicesforthe New FederalSentencing Commission, 35 CATH. U. L. REV. 181 (1985).
Other states such as Louisiana, Oregon, and Tennessee, have also adopted determinate sentencing.
See Knapp, supra note 31, at 48.
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impose the presumptive prison term or to give reasons in writing for imposing
a different term, unless the sentence was imposed pursuant to a plea bargain
approved by the judge. The judge's reasons could be drawn from the
statutory aggravating and mitigating factors or from any circumstances
relevant to just punishment, rehabilitation or incapacitation of the offender, or
to the deterrence of crime. Parole was eliminated, and automatic appeal was
allowed for sentences outside the presumptive range, unless pursuant to a plea
bargain.33
Many state legislatures have established commissions to develop
sentencing guidelines. California adopted a sentencing structure that combines
presumptive guidelines with determinate sentencing.
The California
Legislature has defined lower, middle and upper prison terms for specified
offenses. In the case of burglary, for example, the permissible terms of
incarceration are two, three or four years. The middle term is presumed,
unless aggravating or mitigating circumstances justify the upper or lower
term. 4 In Florida the process of developing sentencing guidelines began
with four circuits selected to participate in a study using guidelines. The
legislature then passed a bill creating the Sentencing Guidelines Commission.
This commission established the present guidelines used in the state.35
Minnesota's sentencing guidelines, one of the earliest reforms, have
served as a model for other jurisdictions. 6 The Minnesota Sentencing
Guideline Commission was established in 1978 by the Minnesota Legislature.37 In Minnesota the legislature decided that sentencing discretion would
be exercised by the courts within the constraints of the sentencing guidelines.
The commission chose the specific sentencing ranges and then submitted them
to the legislature. When the legislature took no action, the guidelines became
law. The guidelines provide a range from which the judge can deviate if the
judge justifies it with written reasons.38 By using a table which combines
facts about the crime and the criminal history of the offender, the judge
determines a sentence. To establish the offender's criminal history "score,"
the sentencing judge gives the offender one point for each prior felony
conviction, one point if the offender was on probation or parole at the time of
the offense, one-half point for each prior gross misdemeanor conviction, and
one-quarter point for each prior misdemeanor conviction. 9

33. Stevens H. Clarke, North Carolina's Determinate Sentencing Legislation, 68
JUDICATURE 140, 141-42 (1984).
34. ALBERT J. LuPsON & MARK A. PETERSON, CALIFORNIA JUSTICE UNDER DETERMINATE
SENTENCING: A REviEW AND AGENDA FOR RESEARCH (1980).

35. Holton, supranote 29, at 20-23.
36. PANEL ON SENTENCING RESEARCH, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, 1 RESEARCH ON
SENTENCING: THE SEARCH FOR REFORM 61 (1983).
37. Kay A. Knapp, What Sentencing Reform in MinnesotaHas andHas Not Accomplished,
68 JUDICATURE 181, 182 (1984).
38. Id. at 185. See also Peter B. Pope, How Unreliable Fdectfinding Can Undermine
Sentencing Guidelines, 95 YALE L.J. 1258 (1987).
39. MINN. STAT. ANN. app. § 244 (West 1992).
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In the District of Columbia the sentencing guidelines are unique because
the Superior Court rather than a legislative body authorized the guidelines.
These guidelines allow the parole board to release offenders at its discretion.4 °
Reform has also taken place at the national level with Congress
establishing the United States Sentencing Commission to create sentencing
guidelines for federal crimes. Under the federal guidelines, the convicted
offense establishes the "base offense level." The judge then examines the
specific offense characteristics and adjusts the initial base offense level. Next,
the judge checks to see whether other, general adjustments apply and if the
offender's criminal history affects the sentence. All of this is then translated
into a final numerical offense level. Lastly, this number is translated into a
sentence by consulting a table. If the judge thinks the sentence is too light or
too severe, the judge can impose a different sentence if the judge justifies it
with written reasons, which that are reviewable by the appellate court for
reasonableness.41
VI. CONSIDERATIONS WHEN DRAFTING SENTENCING GUIDELINES
This Section describes factors which should be considered when drafting
sentencing guidelines. The material in this Section comes from the experiences of many different states as well as the federal system, which use sentencing
guidelines. These varying experiences should allow states to learn from the
successes and mistakes of other states and the federal courts.
A. Commission-DevelopedGuidelines versus
Legislatively Developed Guidelines
The first question in the formation of sentencing guidelines is whether to
form a commission to develop the sentencing guidelines, as was done in the
federal system, or to have the state legislature develop the guidelines. A
sentencing commission would consist of participants who represent various
parts of the criminal justice system. The commission would develop the
sentencing guidelines, and the legislature would have the opportunity to veto
the guidelines.
An advantage of the commission system is the involvement of many
participants of the criminal justice system. A commission would provide a
forum for the expression of many viewpoints, including those opposed to
sentencing guidelines, so as to create a system that participants in the criminal
justice system favor or at least can live with. On the other hand, one
disadvantage of the commission system is that the commission is one more
step away from the public, whereas the legislators are directly elected by the
people. Since sentencing reform impacts citizens, the direct accountability of
the reformers may be preferred.

40. Knapp, supra note 31, at 48.
41. Judge Stephen Breyer, Member of the Sentencing Comm'n, Address at Harvard Law
School (Apr. 2, 1990); see U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, GuidelinesManual § 5K2.0 (Nov. 1991).
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Commission-developed guidelines may be easier for the legislature to
pass due to the two-step process such guidelines involve. First, the legislature
passes a bill that establishes a sentencing commission. A legislator who is on
the fence may go ahead and vote to set up the commission knowing that later
he or she can always reject the commission's recommendations. After a
period of time during which the commission holds meetings and public
forums, the commission reports its recommendations to the legislature. If the
legislature does not act, these recommendations become law. Thus, in order
to stop the sentencing guidelines, those opposed to reform must generate
support against the guidelines. This situation probably acts to the advantage
of those who favor the guidelines because legislators can take no action and
the guidelines become law. In addition, the guidelines would have been
developed by a commission made up of representatives of participants in the
judicial system-judges, prosecutors, and public defenders-resulting in a
legislature deferring to the commission's collective judgment.
B. Establish a Purpose and General Philosophical
Basisfor Sentencing
Before actually drafting the guidelines, the legislature or the sentencing
commission must determine what aspects of indeterminate sentencing should
be changed and what goals are to be achieved by sentencing reform. The
legislature, as the people's representative, is the preferable body to establish
these goals. The process and the outcome of sentencing reform will be
unsuccessful without clear, established goals. Even though sentencing goals
may be lofty and vague, "the alternative is purposelessness or arbitrary
action."4 As one commentator has noted, "some statement of purposes
serves as a checklist in organizing the thoughts of advocates, judges, and
legislators, and usefully prevents blind pursuit of a single goal where multiple
'
goals are plainly involved."43
The established goals should be as specific as possible. Underlying much
of the sentencing reform movement is the shift away from rehabilitation
toward a 'just deserts" type of punishment. Yet, the goal of sentencing reform
must go beyond this general theory of punishment. Treating similar cases
alike is a common purpose of sentencing reform; that is, a "soft" judge or a
"hard" judge should give the same sentence to similar offenders. This
uniformity goal promotes fairness and avoids inconsistent treatment, which
may undermine deterrence "by creating a perception among potential offenders
that they may escape a threatened sanction if they get a 'soft' judge."44 The
federal Sentencing Reform Act is evidence that uniformity has become a goal
in and of itself. The Act's stated purpose is "to avoid unwarranted sentence

42. Louis B. Schwartz, Options in ConstructingaSentencingSystem:SentencingGuidelines
UnderLegislative or JudicialHegemony, in REFORM AND PUNISHMENT 71, 88 (Michael Tonry
& Franklin E. Zimring, eds., 1983).
43. Id.
44. Paul H. Robinson, A Sentencing System for the 21st Century?, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1, 8
(1987). Paul Robinson was the lone dissenter on the United States Sentencing Commission.
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disparities among defendants
with similar records who have been found guilty
45
of similar conduct.t1
In addition to uniformity and retribution, other goals include insuring
proportionality in sentencing (more serious offenses should result in more
serious sanctions), increasing judicial accountability in sentencing, and
providing more severe penalties for violent crimes and repeat offenders.46
Minnesota added an additional goal to its guidelines: to avoid exceeding
current prison capacity; however, this goal is ignored by most states.47
Once the sentencing reform goals are established, the sentencing
commission4" must assess current sentencing practices. The commission
must know and examine the current sentencing trends. The commission
should assess the sentences imposed as well as the prison terms actually
served.4 9 This evaluation should provide the commission with a barometer
to gauge whether current sentencing practices would be consistent with the
defined sentencing purposes embodied in the new statute. Once this is
complete, the state must decide if its guidelines will be prescriptive or
descriptive.
The descriptive approach uses past practice as a basis for establishing
sentencing ranges and views the construction of sentencing guidelines
primarily as a technical matter. Under this approach, sentencing reform
models the sentences after current sentencing practices. In New York, for
example, the sentence ranges were designed to maintain the level of

45. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (1988).

46.

FREDERICK ET AL., supra note 21, at 10.
47. The Minnesota Legislature set forth the following goals for their Sentencing
Commission:
1. Sentencing should be neutral with respect to the race, gender, social, or economic
status of convicted felons.
2. While commitment to the Commissioner of Corrections is the most severe
sanction that can follow conviction of a felony, it is not the only significant sanction
available to the sentencing judge. Development of a rational and consistent
sentencing policy requires that the severity of sanctions increase in direct proportion
to increases in the severity of criminal offenses and the severity of criminal histories
of convicted felons.
3. Because the capacities of state and local correctional facilities are finite, use of
incarcerative sanctions should be limited to those convicted of more serious offenses
or those who have longer criminal histories. To ensure such usage of finite
resources, sanctions used in sentencing convicted felons should be the least
restrictive necessary to achieve the purpose of the sentence.
4. While the Sentencing Guidelines are advisory to the sentencing judge, departures
from the presumptive sentences established in the Guidelines should be made only
when substantial and compelling circumstances exist.
MINN. STAT. ANN. app. § 244 (Vest 1992).
48. The term "commission" will be used to imply the use of a sentencing commission to
devise the sentencing guidelines. In the case of a state, where the legislature establishes the
guidelines, the legislature would complete these tasks.
49. Brian Forst et al., Sentencing and Social Science: Research for the Formulationof
FederalSentencing Guidelines, 7 HoFsTRA L. REv. 355, 368 (1979).
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punishment produced under the indeterminate system, and, thus, the time
actually served by defendants became the benchmark for establishing sentence
ranges under the guidelines.5"
A descriptive approach is attractive because it (1) utilizes the expertise
of the sentencing judges by basing guidelines on what they actually do;
(2) minimizes disruptions in the criminal justice system by constructing
sentence ranges around established sentencing norms; (3) bases sentencing
guidelines on two well-established sentencing criteria: the characteristics of
the offense committed and those of the offender; and (4) provides judges with
a concise picture of their decisions and an opportunity to examine, to evaluate,
and to modify their decisions as they see fit." Basing guidelines on the
"implicit policies" of the past makes this method more attractive to the
judiciary because judges feel they have a "say" in the development of the
guidelines.5 2
Critics of the descriptive approach claim that it institutionalizes the biases
and injustices associated with an indeterminate system, rather than seeks to
rectify those ills. Some critics claim that it is irrational to assume that one
sentencing norm can be derived from multiple sentencing goals without
at
53
'least evaluating the individual merits of these contending philosophies.
The prescriptive approach focuses on the philosophies and policy issues
that underlie sentencing, based upon the belief that current sentences should
be considered on par with other available sentencing options. Minnesota used
this approach, believing that the development of guidelines should be shaped
by policy concerns, not by the application of a mathematical formula.5 4 In
Minnesota sentencing was viewed as a normative problem of how punishment
should be allocated given limited resources. The criticisms of this approach
are that it is difficult to translate crime seriousness into a specific sentence or
to qualify a moral concept such as deservedness of punishment.
Despite the differences between these two theories, the line between them
is quite blurred. This blurring occurs because the research, on which the
guidelines are based, is essentially descriptive, yet the very term "guidelines"
implies prescriptive.56 In addition, a complete prescriptive approach is
impossible unless the commission is able to operate under Rawls' veil of
ignorance." An example of such line blurring is the Federal Sentencing

50. NEW YORK STATE COMM. ON SENTENCING GUIDELINES, DETERMINATE SENTENCING
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 58 (Mar. 1985).

51. Forst et al., supra note 49, at 371-72.
52. Deborah M. Carrow, JudicialSentencing Guidelines: Hazards of the Middle Ground,
68 JUDICATURE 161, 164 (1984).
53. See ANDREw VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE 62-64 (1977).
54. Alberghini, supra note 32, at 198.
55. Kay A. Knapp, Impact ofMinnesotaSentencing Guidelineson Sentencing Practices,5
HAMLINE L. REv. 237, 239 (1982).
56. Stephen D. Gottfredson& Don M. Gottfredson, ToolsforStructuringCourtDiscretion:
What Do They Work For and Why Don't They Work Better?, 1 CIUM. JUST. POL'Y REv. 268,
275 (1986).
57. Rawls' approach hypothesizes that people are placed behind a "veil of ignorance," so
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Guidelines. The United States Sentencing Commission by and large followed
past practice, yet altered the punishments when it felt that past practice was
inaccurate or unfair. This alteration was especially common for crimes when
there were few past cases on which to base the guidelines. The UnitedStates
SentencingCommission GuidelinesManual explains the process of determining sentencing ranges in this way: "While the Commission has not considered
itself bound by pre-guidelines sentencing practice, it has not attempted to
develop an entirely new system of sentencing on the basis of theory alone."58
The federal commission did deviate from past practice in certain areas, such
as white collar crimes, when past practice generally showed straight probationary sentencing. The guidelines now provide for short terms of confinement. 9 The result is an approach that combines descriptive and prescriptive
elements.
A state adopting sentencing guidelines must first establish its purposes
and goals in reforming its criminal sentencing system. This guidance will
provide a mandate to the legislative committee or guidelines commission to
follow when developing guidelines. In addition, goal-setting will force the
legislature to explain its reasons for sentencing reform, including setting
important goals such as how sentencing guidelines will affect prison
population. These goals can then be translated into policy by the sentencing
commission.
C. Develop Crime SeriousnessScales
A three-step process takes place in the development of sentencing
guidelines. First, an assessment of the seriousness of the criminal conduct is
completed, and different categories are created for each offense. These
categories are called "base offense levels." Second, these base offense levels
are adjusted for relevant conditions and characteristics of the offense or
offender. These adjustments result in a sanction level, which in the third step
is translated into a sentence.6" In this subsection, step one of the process is
examined.
Generally, these three steps are completed by the sentencing commission
established by the legislature. In the case of legislatively developed
guidelines, these three steps take place in the legislative committee.
In order to develop categories of criminal conduct, sentencing guidelines
commissions tend to begin with the present state criminal code and then
redefine each crime to create more categories for each offense. Developing
enough categories so that the guidelines are workable and the punishment
"fits" the crime can be a difficult problem. If the punishment for each offense

that they do not know what their place in society will be. From this "original position," they
must make the distributional rules under which they will live. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE (1971).
58. U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, GuidelinesManual, Ch.1, Pt.4(g) (Nov. 1991).
59. Stephen Breyer, The Sentencing Guidelines and Substantive Criminal Code Revision 11
n.46 (1990) (unpublished manuscript).
60. See Knapp, supra note 31, at 49; Robinson, supra note 44, at 41.
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is based upon the "worst case" offense, the punishment may be perceived by
judges as too harsh for a particular offender.6 For example, North Carolina
defined crimes so broadly that formulating penalties commensurate with the
harmfulness of the defendant's conduct was difficult.62 A small number of
broad categories, furthermore, creates a large jump in punishment between
categories. For instance, the maximum sentence may jump ten or fifteen years
from one class of felonies to the next.63 Broad categories can exacerbate the
effect of the specific crime with which the defendant is charged on the
defendant's sentence. More categories with narrow definitions can help
eliminate those problems.
Commissions should work to increase the number of categories in order
to lessen sentencing differences among categories. This goal must be
tempered with a small enough number of categories so that the system remains
workable. In order to achieve these contradicting goals, Paul Robinson, a
member of the United States Sentencing Commission, recommends that the
components of the crime be defined as generically as possible, so long as the
definition isolates and accurately identifies the characteristic that makes the
conduct harmful or antisocial. 4 Robinson recommends that generic terms
be used as building blocks to define a crime. For example, a commission may
wish to have a separate crime for unlawful takings from banks by employees.
Instead of identifying a new component for "unlawful takings from a bank by
an employee," the better approach would be to designate unlawful taking as
a generic component used to define many crimes and to add breach of trust
as a second generic component to define the offense.6"
D. Adjustments Based on Offense and Offender
The second step involves making adjustments to the general offense
categories that have been developed. Adjustments are made based upon the
specific offense and the specific offender. The manner, in which these
adjustments affect the sentencing system, varies from state to state.
In the federal system, the defendant is assigned a number called a "base
offense level" according to the convicted offense. The sentencing judge looks
at the specific offense characteristics, such as whether a gun was used and the
role of the defendant in the crime. These characteristics are given values
which are added to the base offense level. The judge then considers the
offender's criminal history and adds points for past crimes in order to

61. Knapp, supra note 31, at 49.
62. Clarke, supra note 33, at 142.
63. Schwartz, supra note 42, at 642-43.
64. Robinson, supranote 44, at 32-33.
65. Id. at 33. Some examples of Robinson's definitions of crimes: Robbery--(1) unlawful
taking, and (2) causing, risking, or threatening personal or psychological injury, with (3) an
aggravating adjustment because the offender caused, risked, or threatened injury for pecuniary
gain; Kidnapping-(1) unlawful restraint, and (2) causing, risking, or threatening personal or
psychological injury; Burglary--(1) a trespass, and (2) an attempt to cause another offense
component such as unlawful taking or unconsented intercourse. Id. at 41-42.
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calculate a final number that will determine the sentence. 6 This system
mirrors the way a judge thinks by looking at both the specific crime
committed and factors of the particular offense and offender.
Robinson recommended that these aggravating and mitigating adjustments
be stated in general terms that adequately define the conduct so that practicality and efficiency are promoted.6 7 For example, the sentencing system could
incorporate a general adjustment that sentences an attempt at a certain
percentage less than the completed offense, all other things being equal. 8
Robinson explained, "Other factors that might be stated in general terms
include: the extent of an offender's lack of meaningful exercise of free choice
(as in insanity or duress), the existence or believed existence of justifying
circumstances such as a mistaken belief that one is using defensive force, the
reasonableness of a mistake of law, and the degree of sincere remorse."69
Sentencing systems also often make adjustments for cooperation with
authorities as a way of almost codifying plea bargaining.
Additional advantages of these general adjustments include deterreihce and
simplification of the system. Defendants will know the effect of additional
"bad" conduct on their sentence. For instance, they will know that if they
complete the crime, their sentence will be a certain percentage higher than if
they stop and only commit an inchoate offense. They will also know the
additional effect of using a gun to commit a crime. In addition, because
general adjustments can be used to apply to many different crimes, the
sentencing code will be of a manageable length.
When dealing with adjustments for past crimes, the commission must
decide how much the base offense level should be increased for different types
of past crimes and if a past crime of a similar nature should cause more of an
increase. Another problem is how much each additional past crime should
increase the sentence. It is unworkable to have each new offense increase the
sentence by the same amount; therefore, the commission must devise a chart
or formula to show how much a sentence or offense value would be increased
for each prior offense.
Minnesota has developed a matrix which codifies adjustments. One side
of the matrix specifies the offense, taking into account the factors discussed
above dealing with the particular offense characteristics. The other side of the
matrix contains numbers that account for the specific characteristics of the
defendant, that is, the offender's criminal history.
Sentencing commissions must deal with the important, but difficult
question of what factors should affect sentences. When examining prior
records, a commission must decide whether to count all misdemeanors and
how to treat juvenile records. Most systems have either declined to take
juvenile records into account or have taken into account only serious felonies
committed after a certain age. Arrest records generally do not affect the
presumed sentence range. Arrest records do correlate with the tendency to

66.
67.
68.
69.

U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, Guidelines Manual § 4Al.1 (Nov. 1991).
Robinson, supra note 44, at 34.
For a detailed statistical example, see id. at 44-45.
Id. at 34-35.
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commit future crimes, but commissions tend to ignore arrest records when
calculating offender scores for due process reasons.70
E. Attach Specific Punishments to the Scales Developed
Determining which specific punishment "fits" the crime raises the
unanswerable question of how much a robbery is worth, a life is worth, and
so on. The philosophical discussion of descriptive versus prescriptive
sentencing takes on a practical meaning when answering this question. To
help formulate the federal sentencing guidelines, Judge Breyer, a member of
the United States Sentencing Commission, explained that a probation officer
looked at 10,000 cases over the last three years to develop the data on which
the commission based its sentences.7 This descriptive method of basing
sentences on past practice was used because it was politically more acceptable
and exerted some control on the commission's development of sentences.
While past practice was the baseline for sentences, the commission did deviate
from past practice in two main ways. First, in crimes such as treason, when
there was little data, the commission did not necessarily follow the data.
Second, the sentences for white collar criminals were increased ten to twenty
percent so that the sentences were equal with theft.72 In the act establishing
the commission, Congress placed some constraint on the ranges developed by
the commission. The sentence range imposed for each category of offense and
offender was subject to a twenty-five percent limitation on the difference
between the maximum and minimum terms of imprisonment recommended.
Breyer recognized an academic argument presented by a fellow
commission member, Paul Robinson, that prescriptive sentencing is superior.74 Breyer responded to this argument by examining the possible
alternative methods for developing prescriptive sentences. One popular
method in academic circles proposed by Robinson was to rank order crimes
by seriousness under ajust deserts model. Difficulty in agreeing on the ranks
is a problem with rank order. For example, when the District of Columbia
Sentencing Commission tried this method, one member had strong feelings
about how horrible incest was; therefore, incest was ranked at the same level
as aggravated rape.75 In addition, this method replaces the views of all
judges as indicated by their past practice with the views of the members of the
sentencing commission. There is no reason to assume that the seven United
States Sentencing Commission members are better at determining the relative
rank of various crimes than all federal judges.
A second alternative to descriptive sentencing is the use of the amount
of punishment necessary to deter future unlawful conduct. The problems with
this approach are obvious; evidence shows that the deterrent effect of

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Breyer, supranote 41.
Id.; see U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, Guidelines Manual, Ch.1, Pt.A(3) (Nov. 1991).
Breyer, supranote 41.
28 U.S.C. § 994(b) (1988).
See Robinson, supra note 44.
Breyer, supranote 41. See generally Gottfredson & Gottfredson, supra note 56.
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punishment is extremely difficult to assess.76 Studies highlight the great
variability in recidivism rates and the difficulty of determining what deters
criminals."
Determining the "correct" amount of incarceration for a particular offense
can be extremely difficult. The sentencing commissions have a great deal of
power to increase or decrease sentences, but this power may not be as broad
as it appears initially. The public pressures commissions to increase the
sentencing ranges, while corrections and government officials pressure
commissions not to make the sentences so high that they will seem ridiculous
or cost the state too much money. These opposing forces constrain the
commission.
Early sentencing reform overlooked the use of intermediate and nonincarcerative sanctions. These sanctions are less costly than a prison or jail
sentence and can often result in some rehabilitation, a goal which has
essentially been abandoned in prisons. Guidelines, which do not utilize such
sanctions, force judges who want to impose intermediate sanctions to depart
from the guidelines.
Significant innovations in the development of intermediate sanctions have
occurred in recent years. Besides the traditional use of short jail terms,
options such as community service, residential treatment, non-residential
treatment, fines, restitution, home detention, electronic monitoring and drug
testing schedules, as well as various levels and forms of probation supervision,
are commonly used. These options, however, have yet to be included in a
comprehensive sentencing system.78

In order for the options to be incorporated into a workable system, they
must be included in the sentencing guidelines, and resources must be allocated
to fund the programs. Due to the many obstacles to implementation, states
have neglected these options. The first problem is the availability of
correctional resources. Many non-imprisonment sanctions are funded locally.
When state legislatures mandate the use of locally funded programs, this
mandate often triggers a demand for state funding assistance. Therefore, states
avoid mandating such programs.79 Second, certain sanctions are more
amenable to urban than to rural settings; therefore, establishing a state-wide
policy becomes complicated. Third, there are few completed studies and data
that assess the impact of such policies. Finally, it is difficult to determine the
appropriateness of a specific sanction, like home detention, in a structured
sentencing policy. Such sanctions are used for various purposes, and the

76. Blumstein, supra note 11, at 133. See also ALFRED BLUMSTEN ET
AND INCAPACITATION:

AL., DETERRENCE

ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ON CRIME RATES

(1978).
77. Jacqueline Cohen, Incapacitationas a Strategyfor Crime Control: Possibilitiesand
Pitfalls, in 5 CRIME AND JUSTICE: AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH 123 (Michael H. Tonry
& Norval Morris eds., 1983). See also JAN M. CHAIKEN & MARCIA R. CHAIKEN, VARIETIES
OF CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR (1982).
78. Knapp, supra note 31, at 50.

79. Id. at 51.
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precise assessment of the fit between a category of offenders and a specific
sanction of sentencing guidelines is probably not possible.8"
Kay Knapp, former executive director of the Minnesota Sentencing
Guidelines Commission, recommends that these obstacles can be overcome by
the use of sanctioning levels and exchange rates. Sanctioning levels would be
substituted in the guideline system for traditional sanctions. For example,
instead of defining six-months imprisonment as the proper presumptive
sentence for a particular category of offenses, the policy would prescribe a
sanction level of six units. These units would be translated into specific
sanctions through the concept of exchange rates. One unit, for example,
translates into forty community-service hours, a month in jail, two months on
probation, or two weeks in residential treatment.8' Judges could choose from
the array of sentencing options available in their area, but the sentencing
guidelines still provide state-wide proportionality in sentencing. This type of
a system has been used for juvenile sentencing in Minnesota. Washington
state and the District of Columbia have utilized some alternative sentencing
in their guidelines, but not with the explicit exchange rate plan that Knapp
proposes.8 3
The United States Sentencing Commission grappled with the problem of
how to allow judicial flexibility to use alternative sanctions, while maintaining
proportionality by insuring that each judge imposes the merited amount of
sanction. Paul Robinson recommended a system, similar to Knapp's, that uses
sanction units. After determining the number of sanction units appropriate for
a particular criminal defendant, the judge could choose from different types
of sanctions as long as the sanction units add up to the correct total. For
example, one sanction unit would equal two-weeks imprisonment, four-weeks
structured residence in a community treatment center or in the eligible
offender's home, eight-weeks intensive probation or intensive supervised
release, twelve weeks of probation or supervised release, 160 hours of
community service, a fine equal to three percent of total assets or $2,000
(whichever is greater,) or six months of occupational disqualification as a
condition of probation.' The guidelines need not leave a judge entirely free
to select among sanctioning methods. The system may place limitations on
judicial discretion such as requiring that the offender make restitution
whenever he or she can afford to, or that drug offenders always receive an
extended period of supervision after release, or that all victims of fraud
receive notice of the offender's conviction. 5 The state or federal government may determine that certain sanctions are inappropriate in certain cases.
House confinement, for example, is not an appropriate sanction for a child
abuse offender or a drug dealer who sold drugs from his home.8 6 These non-

80. Id.

81. Id.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id.
Id.
Robinson, supra note 44, at 53-55.
Id. at 55-56. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3556, 3583(a), 3555 (1988).
Robinson, supra note 44, at 56. See ILL. ANN. STAT. cl. 38, para. 1005-5-3(c)(2)
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imprisonment sanctions are an alternative to building new prisons. In
response to the fear that such sanctions are too lenient, Morris and Tonry
respond that the present system is both too lenient and too severe, and the use
of various intermediate sanctions results in the "appropriate" sanction. 7
F. CoordinateSentences With CorrectionalResources
Determining what effect sentencing guidelines will have on prison
population is an important, but often overlooked step in the development of
sentencing guidelines. States should use the number of prison cells available
to aid in the determination of the length of sentences. State legislatures must
decide how much money they are willing to spend on prisons. When prisons
cost $50,000 to $75,000 per cell to construct, 88 and operating costs are
$10,000 to $15,000 per year, 9 the economic costs of incarceration are far
from irrelevant. Moreover, many prisons are already overcrowded and facing
judicial orders to alleviate this overcrowding.
In order to determine the length of sentences, states should begin with a
projection of prison population without any change in sentencing procedures.
Prison populations must be estimated to avoid either overcrowding or to
prevent prosecutors and judges from informally trying to limit prison
population by circumventing the guidelines.' Demographic data, such as a
rising number of teenagers who are the age group most likely to commit
crime, must also be taken into account by projection studies. The technical
difficulty in making such impact estimates is the central reason why so few
of these studies have been done. 9'
The second step is an analysis of how the proposed sentencing reform
will effect prison population. The U.S. Sentencing Commission study, which
included both steps, suggested that the federal prison population would
increase from 45,000 to 105,000 inmates in ten to fifteen years.92 This entire
of the
increase would not have resulted from the new guidelines since some 93
increase would have been caused by mandatory minimum sentencing and
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987); N.C. GEN: STAT. § 15A-1340.4(a) (1988); TEx. CRIM. PROC. CODE
ANN. art. 42.12, § 3g (West Supp. 1992).
87. NORVAL MORRIS & MICHAEL H. TONRY, BETWEEN PRISON AND PROBATION 12-19

(1990).
88. GAIL S. FUNKE, WHO's BURIED IN GRANT'S TOMB? ECONOMICS AND CORRECTIONS

FOR THE EIGHTIES AND BEYOND 3 (1983). These numbers have probably increased due to
inflation.
89. BRUCE CORY & STEPHEN GETINGER,

TIME

TO BUILD? THE REALmEs

OF PRISON

CONSTRUCTION 15 (1984). These numbers have probably increased due to inflation.
90. Sentencing Policies and Their Impact on Prison Population, in 1 RESEARCH ON
SENTENCING: THE SEARCH FOR REFORM 238 (Alfred Blumstein et al. eds., 1983).
91. Alfred Blumstein, The Impact of Changes in Sentencing Policy on PrisonPopulations,
in 2 RESEARCH ON SENTENCING: THE SEARCH FOR REFORM 460, 472 (Alfred Blumstein et al.
eds., 1983).
92. Breyer, supra note 41.
93. Provision in federal statute that third time drug and violent crime offenders must be at
or near the maximum sentence. Id.
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the increase in drug crimes. The study estimated that six to twelve percent of
the increase would have been attributable to the guidelines. 4 Despite the
availability of such studies, their accuracy is questionable. An impact study
is based on many assumptions, such as how many people will be arrested, how
fast those people will move through the system, and what kinds of sentences
they will receive. A change in any of these assumptions will change the
projection for prison population.
Following all of the studies, the final step is issuing a prison impact
statement. This statement, issued by those formulating the sentencing reform,
forces a consideration of the costs associated with any particular sentencing
policy. Absent such consideration, politicians would feel free to posture by
demanding tougher sentences.9"
Minnesota's approach to prison population is unique.96 The consideration of correctional resources was one of the mandates to the Minnesota
Sentencing Guidelines Commission (MSGC).97 The MSGC interpreted this
legislative mandate to mean that prison populations, as a result of the
guidelines, should not exceed prison capacity.98 In contrast, New York's
Commission, under a similar directive to consider correctional resources, did
not interpret it as meanin that proposed sentences must conform to currently
capacity.t
planned prison
This constraint forced the MSGC to limit the number of crimes that
would result in imprisonment; if the commission wanted to increase the
sentence for one crime, it would have to decrease the sentence for another
crime. In order to determine what effects changes in the guidelines would
have on prison population, the commission used a simulated model that
estimated future prison population based on various sentencing schedules.'
The commission also set up a monitoring system 0so that sentences could be
re-evaluated and adjusted to avoid overcrowding.' '
The commission felt consideration of corrections resources was legitimate
because (1) the state has an obligation to avoid subjecting confined citizens to
inhumane conditions and such conditions are likely to develop in overcrowded
correctional institutions; (2) the MSGC is not a legislative body and cannot
appropriate the funds required to provide additional prison bed space; (3) if
the commission ignored the population impact of its decisions and the
legislature did not appropriate additional funds, it would be the explicit public
policy of Minnesota to operate prisons beyond their capacity."°

94. Id.
95. Blumstein, supra note 11, at 139.
96. Minnesota is the only state to have such a policy. FREDERICK ET AL., supra note 21,

at 10.
97. MINN.STAT. ANN. app. § 244 (West 1992). See infra note 102 and accompanying text.
98. Martin, supra note 2, at 45-46.
99. Alberghini, supranote 32, at 191-92.
100. Blumstein, supranote 11, at 138.
.101. Knapp, supra note 37, at 184-85.
102. Id. at 183-84.
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In contrast, Minnesota's critics allege that it is inappropriate to have a
system that adjusts sentence ranges depending on the availability of prison
beds. Resources alone should not drive punishment, and punishment should
be more absolute. A problem with the critics' view is that it results in shifting
discretion to the back door; that is, parole boards are used to release offenders
to alleviate prison overcrowding. When legislatures and commissions are
honest about the constraints of correctional resources, the reason for certain
sentences are clear. When correctional resources are ignored and overcrowding results, "back door discretion" becomes common; parole boards or
mechanisms such as good time, meritorious credits, program credits or
administrative leave are used to alleviate overcrowding. Responsibility is
shifted from judges to the back door, a situation similar to indeterminate
sentencing.
G. DeparturesFrom Guidelines and Other ProceduralIssues
Sentencing guidelines allow the trial judge to depart from presumptive
ranges if the judge provides written findings to justify the departure. The
standard which determines when the judge may depart varies from state to
state. In the federal system, the rules governing departure restrict the judge's
ability to sentence outside of the presumptive guideline range. The judge
must base the departure on aggravating or mitigating circumstances that were
not adequately taken into consideration by the commission when developing
the sentencing ranges. The commission lists fourteen circumstances that it did
not take into account but this list is not exhaustive." 3 Congress and the
commission have also stated that certain factors normally affecting sentencing
cannot be used to justify departure: the age of the defendant; his educational
and vocational skills or lack thereof; his mental, emotional or physical
condition at the time of the offense; his drug or alcohol dependence; his
employment record; his family responsibility; and his community ties."°
The defendant's cooperation with prosecutors can be used to justify a
decreased sentence. 05
Both Minnesota and Washington have adopted a standard that allows the
judge to depart from the guidelines for substantial and compelling reasons.1 6 The Minnesota Supreme Court had adopted a rule that the
maximum sentence allowed was twice the presumptive sentence,0 7 but the
court later backed away from that rule saying that the only maximum limits

103. Stephen H. Glickman & Steven M. Slaky, CriminalDefense in the Era of Sentencing

Guidelines, in LITIGATION

AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES,

1989

(PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 1 c4-4215 1989).
104. Id. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(e) (1988).
105. Glickman & Slaky, supra note 103.
106. Id.
107. State v. Evans, 311 N.W.2d 481, 483 (Minn. 1981).
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were those set by statute."0 3 The Washington Supreme Court explicitly
rejected the doubling standard."
Many procedural aspects of the sentencing guidelines must be considered
to insure that the commission creates a workable plan. The commission must
decide what to do with juveniles and, thus, structure a sentencing system
designed for juveniles or maintain the current system with judicial discretion.
Policy makers must also decide whether concurrent or consecutive sentences
will be used. Under indeterminate sentencing the judge generally determines
whether the sentences are concurrent or consecutive. In Minnesota the MSGC
decided that concurrent sentences would be the norm with the most severe
sentence dictating the sentence served. Consecutive sentences would be
permissible, but not required, in limited circumstances such as multiple felony
convictions that involve a crime against the person or when the conviction was
for escape from lawful custody."0 Third, the commission must decide
whether the use of "good time" in prisons will continue.
A fourth consideration for states is whether discretion should be
eliminated at the back door: whether parole should be eliminated altogether.
Most sentencing guidelines eliminate parole so as to create "real time"
sentencing (subject in some states to deductions for "good time"). A minority
of states retain parole."' Eliminating parole achieves honesty in sentencing" 2 because parole completely undercuts the use of sentencing guidelines." 3 Some guidelines allow limited back door discretion, but such
discretion usually takes the form of a good time credit determined by a set
formula, instead of the subjectivity of parole boards. Allowing some back
door discretion may. affect the length of sentences imposed, but does not affect
the formulation of sentencing guidelines. Elimination of subjective parole
creates "real time" sentencing and prevents sentencing guidelines from being
circumvented at the back door. While this circumvention may keep politicians
from having to make tough political decisions, it does not create honesty in
sentencing.
In order to enforce the use of sentencing guidelines and to review the
sentences imposed, most states use appellate review. In Minnesota, as in most
states, both the defendant and the state have an automatic right of appeal for
any sentence outside of the presumptive range." 4 The result in Minnesota
has been surprisingly few sentencing appeals. Only 130 opinions were issued
from May 1980 through April 1984, yet the threat of review has served as an
effective enforcement mechanism for judges." 5
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109. State v. Oxborrow, 723 P.2d 1123, 1127-28 (Wash. 1986).
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111. FREDERICK ET AL., supra note 21, at 15-16.
112. U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, GuidelinesManual, Ch.1, Pt.A(3) (Nov. 1991).
113. N. Gary Holton & Roger Handberg, Florida'sSentencing Guidelines:Surviving-But
Just Barely, 73 JUDICATURE 259, 267 (1990).
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H. The Importance of Feedback
As sentencing guidelines are a relatively recent phenomenon, constant
feedback is necessary to reform and improve the guidelines. Minnesota
pioneered a permanent feedback system when it created its sentencing
guidelines. The Minnesota Commission collects data to determine how often
the guidelines are followed and the reasons for departures. This data can be
used by the legislature and the commission to modify sentencing policies and
to coordinate sentencing practices and correctional resources. The feedback
also forces participants in the system to be accountable for their sentencing
decisions."' Feedback allows the commission to further refine the system,
so that the quality of sentencing will continue to increase. Any state
developing sentencing guidelines should refer to the adjustments made by
other states to avoid the same mistakes and then set up its own feedback
system to constantly improve its guidelines.

L Obtain Supportfor Sentencing Reform
Participants in the criminal justice system deal with the guidelines on a
day-to-day basis and can exert pressure on the legislature. Thus, the designers
of sentencing reform should examine the needs and interests of the individuals
and groups that comprise the criminal justice system and see how best their
needs can be met within the goals of system.
Judges, of course, are important participants in the criminal justice
system. Judges' opinions on sentencing reform vary from state to state and
among judges within the same state. Judge Breyer reports that a federal study
showed that fifty percent of the federal judges favored sentencing guidelines. " 7 Judges sometimes dislike sentencing reform because their discretion
is reduced, but with the elimination of parole, judges' discretion can actually
be increased. The elimination of parole may help to alleviate judges' fears
about sentencing reform by creating honesty in sentencing, one of the goals
of the United States Sentencing Commission." 8
The support of those involved in the criminal justice system is crucial to
the passage of sentencing reform. Promulgating new sentencing standards will
result in institutional changes that affect many participants in the system, and
the needs of these participants must be taken into account. Thus, "[t]hose
jurisdictions that have made extensive efforts to obtain the understanding and
support of all affected interest groups appear to have been more successful in
gaining legislative approval when needed and fuller compliance when
implemented than those that have not made such efforts." 119

116. See Kay A. Knapp, The Sentencing Commission's Empirical Research, in THE
SENTENCING COMMISSION AND ITS GuIDELINEs 107 (Andrew von Hirsch et al. eds., 1987); see
also Robinson, supra note 44, at 13-14.
117. Breyer, supra note 41.
118. U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, Guidelines Manual, Ch.1, Pt.A(3) (Nov. 1991).
119. StructuringSentencingDecisions, in 1 RESEARCH ON SENTENCING: THE SEARCH FOR
REFORM 126, 174 (Alfred M. Blumstein et al. eds., 1983).
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The public is also a key constituency. According to a Department of
Justice survey, eighty-five percent of Americans believe that the courts in their
local area are "not harsh enough" with criminals. 2 ° Therefore, legislators
face constituents who want harsher sentences but resist paying for more prison
beds in which to put the criminals. The public can react harshly to the use of
"real time" because it believes criminals are receiving a lighter sentence when
actually that may not be case at all.' By a two-to-one margin the public
"place[s] a lot of blame" for the high crime rate on judges." This loss of
confidence in the judiciary may indicate one reason why the public supports
the decrease of judicial discretion with sentencing reform." Therefore, the
public seems to send its elected officials contradictory messages: opposing
reform when it leads to "real time" sentencing, but favoring reform when it
decreases judicial discretion in sentencing.
VII. THE EFFECT OF SENTENCING GUIDELINES ON
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

This final Section of this Article examines the effects of sentencing
guidelines in the federal courts and states that have adopted them. This
aualysis should provide states with some idea of the effect that guidelines
would have on their criminal justice systems.
A. Trials and Plea Bargaining
Sentencing guidelines may reduce plea bargaining and increase the
number of trials, a concern judges often express. A sentencing scheme based
on the facts of the criminal episode, rather than on whether the defendant
pleads guilty, may result ifi a decrease in guilty pleas unless the system
provides some explicit benefit for a guilty plea.' ' Even a slight reduction
in the percentage of guilty pleas would cause a significant increase in the
percentage of trials. For example, a reduction in guilty pleas from ninety
percent to eighty percent requires the assignment of twice the number of
judges, court reporters, bailiffs, clerks, jurors and courtrooms. A decrease to
seventy percent triples this demand."
The federal system specifically provides that a defendant is not entitled
to a sentence reduction simply for pleading guilty. Therefore, it would appear
that an increase in trials would result, but the system provides some advantages for pleading guilty. First, the guidelines offer a two-level reduction in the

120. John M. Greacen, What Standards Should We Use to Judge Our Courts?, 72
JUDICATURE 23, 24 (1988).
121. See FREDERICK ET AL., supra note 21, at 34.
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offense level to defendants who manifest an "acceptance of personal
responsibility." 2 6
Second, the guidelines may actually penalize the
unsuccessful presentation of a defense at trial. One guideline provides for a
two-level sentence increase if the defendant "attempts to impede or obstruct
the administration of justice during the ... prosecution of the instant
offense." 27 Thus, a possible four-level difference exists between pleading
guilty and being found guilty at trial. Third, under the guidelines judges
retain the discretion to sentence anywhere within the range, and a guilty plea
may increase the likelihood of a sentence at the low end of the range. While
there may be less room to negotiate, some room remains, and defendants will
take what they can get. If the ranges are too small, such as three to four
years, negotiation would become useless and the sentence advantage of
pleading guilty before trial would be eliminated. To date, this has not been
a problem because most ranges are larger. Fourth, the guidelines permit
relatively unfettered plea bargaining over the charge or the facts. The charge
and the facts become increasingly important in a determinative sentencing
system where the charge and facts determine within which range the sentence
presumptively falls. Bargaining over mitigating circumstances can also occur.
Finally, the lawyer's pressure on his or her client to plead guilty remains.
Many judges fear sentencing guidelines will increase the number of trials.
According to a survey of federal judges by the Federal Courts Study
Committee, nearly three out of four judges believe that the guidelines have
reduced incentives to plead guilty and that, as a result, their caseloads are
rising.'
Most of the evidence to date shows that the number of trials has
not increased. For example, in North Carolina sentencing guidelines did not
increase the number of trials. In fact, among defendants who pled guilty to
felonies pursuant to a formal plea bargain, the percentage who obtained a
prosecutor's promise to any sort of sentence recommendation decreased from
fifty-nine percent before the guidelines were instituted to forty-five percent
afterwards. 29 Professor Clarke suggests this implies that some defendants,
who formerly would have received a jury trial and been convicted of felonies,
were more willing to plead without a prosecutor's sentence recommendation
after the guidelines were in place."' Clarke's study compared the years
1970 through 1980 (before the guidelines), with the years 1981 through 1982
(after the guidelines). He discovered that the number of trials in district courts
decreased from 1.08 percent
to 0.76 percent and in superior court from 5.71
3
percent to 3.20 percent.' '
Minnesota experienced a similar effect. Despite the primary concern that
an increase in trials would result, approximately five percent of felony
convictions were achieved by means of a trial in 1978, compared to four

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
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percent of felony convictions in the 5500 guideline cases.' In Florida both
bench and jury trial rates declined in two of the three circuits studied.'
An additional effect on caseloads is the timing of guilty pleas. A study
of determinate sentencing in California showed that guilty pleas were made
earlier in the trial process after the sentencing reform.'34
Sentencing reform poses increasing complexity for judges. A study of
federal judges found that one-third of the judges surveyed reported that the
time necessary to sentence felons had increased by at least fifty percent under
the guidelines. 35 Commissions must create a sentencing system that is easy
for the judges to use and master, or the judges may become frustrated and
circumvent the guidelines. In Florida, for example, the guidelines divided all
felonies into nine categories. A separate set of guidelines and a matrix was
established for each category. 6 The confusion created by these nine
matrices led the Florida Sentencing Commission to formulate a revised
structure that used a single sentencing grid.'37
Beyond an increase in complexity and the number of trials, critics are
concerned that more sentences will be appealed. Some anecdotal evidence
shows that this has occurred, but there are no extensive, clear studies on the
subject to date. A study of several states with sentencing guidelines found an
increase in the numbers of appeals raising sentencing issues, yet most of those
appeals involved other issues as well. For instance, sentencing issues were
considered by the Appellate Court in Springfield, Illinois, in fifty-three percent
of their cases in 1983."' Yet, in Rhode Island the percentage of cases
involving sentencing issues was only nine percent for 1983 to 1984.' This
study found that sentencing issues were rarely the cause for reversal of
sentences, but did result in cases being sent back to the trial court for
resentencing 40 A different result occurred in Minnesota, where there was
no increase in appeals after the imposition of sentencing guidelines. Through
February 1982, 8500 sentences had been issued under the guidelines, with
about 1000 of those involving either dispositional or durational departures.
Yet, there were only seventy sentencing appeals. 4'

132. Knapp, supra note 55, at 254.
133. Holten & Handberg, supra note 113, at 261-62.
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B. Prison Population
As discussed earlier, prison population is a constant problem in the
United States. In July 1977, prisons in twenty-nine states and territories were
either under court order for prison overcrowding or were involved in litigation
likely to result in such a court order. By February 1980, this figure had risen
to thirty-two states and territories, and by the end of 1981 the number was
forty.'4 I These statistics on prison population illustrate the importance of
examining the impact of sentencing reform on prison population.
Minnesota coordinated sentencing policy and correctional resources, as
described above; 43 the effect on prison population shows that Minnesota's
plan was successful. During 1981, the first year of the guidelines, incarcerations to prison were close to the level of incarcerations anticipated by the
guidelines. As a result, prison populations dropped from almost 100 percent
of capacity to approximately ninety-three percent of capacity.' Incarcerations in 1982 increased and prison population grew to capacity. A possible
crisis existed; however, the legislature and commission worked together in
1983 to avert the projected crisis in prison population. The legislature
extended the "good time" statute to mandatory minimum sentences that had
previously been excluded.' 45 Minnesota's program is a "success" when
looked at from a prison population perspective, but critics argue that such
changes in the sentencing rules based on prison population are not good for
the criminal justice system. In Minnesota critics point out that the length of
a defendant's sentence could depend on prison capacity. For example, those
imprisoned under mandatory minimum sentences prior to the application of
good time served a longer sentence that those imprisoned today. Critics fear
that more changes such as this one will further harm the goal of proportionality in sentencing.
Overall, the imprisonment rates in Minnesota are lower after the
guidelines; nineteen percent of felons were imprisoned prior to the sentencing
guidelines and fifteen percent after their implementation. 46 However, the
length of sentences did increase. After the guidelines, the average period of
imprisonment was 25.6 months and the average pronounced sentence was 38.3
months; this represents a 19.9 month increase in pronounced sentences. 47
The decrease in imprisonment of property offenders, who tend to serve shorter
sentences, and the increase in sentences for violent offenders and those with
long criminal histories produced the increase in the length of sentences
imposed. For example, forty-five percent of serious person offenders were
sent to prison in the pre-guideline period; after the guidelines, this number was

142. Stephen D. Gottfredson & Ralph B. Taylor, Public Policy and PrisonPopulations:
MeasuringOpinions About Reform, 68 JuDiCATuRE 190, 191-92 (1984).
143. See supratext accompanying notes 96-102.
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seventy-eight percent, a seventy-three percent increase. 48 For those
offenders with low offense severity levels and low criminal history scores,
there was a seventy-two percent reduction in prison sentences, from fifty-four
percent to fifteen percent.'4 9
North Carolina's post-guideline data reveals different results, with the
percentage of convicted felons receiving a prison sentence increasing from
fifty-five percent in 1979 to sixty-three percent in the post-guideline years of
1981 through 1982."50 After the guidelines, sentencing became generally
less severe and less varied. In 1979 the difference between the length of
sentences in the twenty-fifth percentile and the seventy-fifth percentile was
eighty-four months; while in 1981 through 1982, the difference was only
forty-eight months.'' In terms of severity, sentences for the twenty most
frequent felonies showed a slight decrease in sentencing length. Yet, for most
offenses the changes were not statistically significant. 2 The study also
examined North Carolina's prison population and predicted that five years
after the guidelines were in place, the post-guideline prison population would
be about 900 inmates less than it would have been under the pre-guideline
system."
In Florida the commission did not take prison population into account in
formulating its guidelines. In part, this omission has led to a crisis situa'
Historical sentencing practices were used in formulating the
tion. "54
55
guidelines so that the effect on prison population would be "neutral."'
However, Florida has experienced an explosion of drug crime prosecutions,
which strains the entire judicial system, including prisons. With prison
overcrowding reaching crisis proportions, the Florida Sentencing Guidelines
Commission has begun a re-examination of the sentencing guidelines." 6
Florida's experience illustrates two points. First, it is important to
consider the effect of guidelines on prison population, including how
demographics and other factors will affect prison population in the absence of
guidelines. Second, guidelines will not by themselves solve a prison
population problem; either new prisons must be built or sentences must be
shorter.
C. ProsecutorialDiscretion
Critics claim that sentencing reform shifts discretion and power from the
judge to the prosecutor because prosecutors determine what criminal charge
or charges will be brought. Under sentencing guidelines, critics explain that

148.
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the sentence depends most heavily on the particular statutory offense or
offenses of conviction and less heavily on the defendant's actual conduct
underlying the offense or offenses. This criticism is championed by the
defense bar, whose members fear that the importance of the charge under
guideline sentencing results in too much prosecutorial power."5 7
The United States Justice Department's November 1, 1987, Prosecutors
Handbook on Sentencing Guidelines confirmns some of this criticism. This
handbook instructs federal prosecutors that it is "imperative" for them to
consult the guidelines before choosing what offense or counts to charge,
particularly in multi-count cases, in order to obtain the "best," that is the
longest, sentence. 8 The handbook suggests that "if an aggravating factor
is present in a particular case but is not included in the guideline for a specific
offense, the prosecutor should consider whether an alternative way to charge
the offense exists so that the factor will be recognized in the guideline
sentence itself without the need for departure."' 1 9 Especially problematic,

from the perspective of defense counsel, is the handbook's alleged endorsement of sentence enhancement by "splitting counts" between two indictments
or between federal and state prosecutions. For example, if two unrelated
offenses of equal gravity are charged together in the same indictment, they
will result under the guidelines in an offense level "only" two levels greater
than the offense level for one of the offenses alone. If the prosecutor charges
them separately, the defendant could face consecutive sentences."
Some evidence of this increase in prosecutorial power is seen in
jurisdictions that have adopted sentencing guidelines. Federal judges note this
increase in prosecutorial power and report that the guidelines' rigidity is
"causing a massive, though unintended, transfer of discretion and authority
from the court to the prosecutor."' 16' Evidence in Minnesota confirms that
prosecutors are using this power. For instance, if an offender with a limited
criminal history commits an aggravated robbery, but is charged only with
simple robbery, the offender would receive a presumptive stayed sentence
upon conviction instead of a presumptive commitment to prison. 62 Analysis
of evidence from Minnesota shows that some charge manipulation occurs,
especially in aggravated robbery, assault and criminal sexual conduct cases.
For example, in cases where the most serious offense alleged was aggravated
robbery, only 49.2 percent of offenders with criminal history scores of zero
were convicted of that charge, and the majority were convicted of sentences
that did not carry presumptive imprisonment.'63
Approximately sixty
percent of alleged aggravated robbery offenders with a criminal history score

157. See Glickman & Slaky, supra note 103.
158.

Id. (quoting
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of judges).
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of one were convicted of that offense, and 65.9 percent of alleged aggravated
robbery offenders with a criminal history score of two were convicted of
aggravated robbery.'" This data indicates that prosecutors are more likely
to allow charge reduction for aggravated robbery among offenders with
limited criminal histories.
Some evidence from guideline states demonstrates that sentencing
guidelines have not increased prosecutorial power, but have instead shifted the
area for negotiation. The new type of plea bargaining is charge and fact
bargaining. As Professor Charles Ogletree explains, "we still have bargaining,
[but] it's fact bargaining and charge bargaining."'165 In charge bargaining,
the prosecution agrees to dismiss some charges in exchange for a plea of
guilty to others. Because it is the offense of conviction that determines the
presumptive sentence, this plea can result in a sentence reduction. Fact
bargaining involves a stipulation to the operative facts which will be used for
sentencing. Because the facts of the crime, such as whether a gun was used,
contribute to the length of the sentence, the parties can stipulate to the facts
of the offense and, thereby, affect the sentence even under a guideline system.
Provided the operative facts are not misleading, the parties may stipulate to
them. "
While an increase in prosecutorial power was a concern of the Minnesota
Commission, the commission chose not to deal with the issue specifically until
the guidelines went into effect and the situation could be studied. 67
Minnesota continues this monitoring, but has not taken any action. 68 New
York established a similar monitoring program, but found no evidence that its
determinate sentencing has resulted in a significant increase in prosecutorial
power. 169 No specific evidence has shown the effect of this bargaining or
the influence on prosecutorial power beyond the aforementioned inferences,
and no state has established any type of policy to handle such problems.
D. JudicialDiscretion
Sentencing guidelines take the human element out of sentencing. Judges
and others critical of sentencing reform often make this statement. 7 Prior
to sentencing reform, with little statutory guidance and virtually no appellate
review, sentencing judges in most jurisdictions were left to themselves to
decide what facts about a crime or offender were relevant for sentencing and
how those facts ought to affect sentence length. 7 ' Sentences were based
upon ajudges' personal philosophy of criminal law, thus creating a sentencing

164. Id.
165. Charles Ogletree, AssistantProfessor ofLaw, Harvard Law School, Address at Harvard
Law School (Apr. 2, 1990).
166. See Glickman & Slaky, supra note 103.
167. Martin, supra note 2, at 57.
168. Alberghini, supra note 32, at 201-02.
169. Id. at 202.
170. See Holton, supra note 29, at 19.
171. Pope, supra note 38, at 1258-59.
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system varying from judge to judge. Former Judge Marvin Frankel has stated,.
"[S]weeping penalty statutes allow sentences to be 'individualized' not so
much in terms of defendants, but mainly in terms of the wide spectrum of
character, bias, neurosis, and daily vagary encountered among occupants of the
trial bench."'7 Judge Breyer explains that disparity was a problem before
sentencing reform: "If we have a lottery wheel to assign judges, there must
be disparity."''
Sentencing reform, with presumptive sentencing ranges, decreasesjudicial
discretion. Judges' discretion is not completely eliminated, however, because
they may depart from the guidelines. Departure standards still place limits on
judicial discretion. As discussed above, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
allow judges to depart only when a factor not adequately taken into account
by the Sentencing Commission is present. 74 Critics claim that the essential
qualities of the judge, as a professional in the criminal justice system, make
judges most qualified to sentence offenders. Stripping the judge of this power
relegates the judge to an undeserved inferior position by replacing him with
other professionals, such as prosecutors."
Judges consider many factors when sentencing, a process which
sentencing guidelines cannot duplicate. The sentencing ritual is multi-faceted;
the judge examines the character and mental make-up of the offenders and the
circumstances under which the crime was committed. One Justice Department
study claims that judges consider more than two hundred separate factors
when making sentencing decisions.' 76 The authors of the study explained,
"Of course, a judge will not consider all of them in any one case, and different
judges have different views as to whether
77 a given factor should be considered
in sentencing a particular defendant."
One commentator tells the story of a defendant named Henry Roth who
pled guilty to aggravated sexual assault. The sentencing judge felt that
presumptive sentence for this offense was too harsh for this offender, but
when the judge tried to depart from the guidelines, he was reversed by the
appellate court. 7 Evidence showed that Roth was under the influence of
drugs when he committed the assault and that this crime was "out of
character" for Roth. Rather than send Roth to prison, the judge wanted to
sentence Roth to probation upon the condition that Roth attend an inpatient
rehabilitation center and continue his visits to Alcoholics Anonymous. 79 It
is impossible to determine whether this sentencing judge was "correct" in
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giving this defendant probation or if Roth deserved the four-year prison
sentence he received, but it does show a judge who disagreed with the
presumed range and was unable to depart.
Others favor the decrease in discretion. Because guidelines are based in
part on historical sentencing practices, the sentencing criteria are evaluated on
a state-wide, rather than local level. A state-wide system creates equity and
fairness in sentencing in the minds of supporters.' 0 Whether the goals of
equity and fairness are actually met is examined in the next Section, but the
key is that sentencing reform does not decrease discretion as much as critics
would believe. Judges want discretion, and part of this discretion means
certainty that the sentence they give will actually be served. Sentencing
reform is usually combined with an elimination of parole or the use of "real
time" sentences. Thus, while the judges may be forced to operate in a system
that creates a presumptive range, the "back door" sentencing discretion of the
parole board is eliminated.
E. The Goal of DecreasingDisparityand
Achieving Proportionality
To determine the success of sentencing reform, the goals of the reform
must be clearly spelled out. Many state legislatures or sentencing commissions state their goals in enabling legislation. Two of the dominant and most
common goals, which were the catalyst to the reform movement, are
decreasing disparity between sentences of similar offenders and achieving
proportionality among all sentences.
One indirect measurement of how well these goals, as well as all others,
are being achieved is the percentage of cases in which the presumptive
sentence is followed. The resulting data may also provide some insight into
how well the guidelines are drafted. If a large percentage of the cases involve
departures, it may indicate that some factors or circumstances are missing
from the guidelines. As of November 1989, 81.4 percent of all sentences
under the federal sentencing guidelines fell within the presumptive ranges.'
In 1984 and 1985, between 78.9 percent and 84.4 percent of the
sentences in Florida were within the recommended guidelines.'82 Later data
reveals that this trend continued in Florida. Eighty-one percent of all
guideline-recommended sentences through 1986 were ultimately imposed.'
Through 1988, 85.2 percent of the sentences in Florida adhered to the
guidelines.' Leonard Holton, director of the Florida Sentencing Guideline
Commission, indicates that this high percentage illustrates that equity and
fairness in sentencing can be achieved.' 85
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North Carolina found that written reasons were used in only seventeen
percent of its cases.1 6 For the first 5500 cases in Minnesota, the departure
rate was 6.2 percent, with half of the departures upwards and half downwards. 1 7 The numbers are not as low for executed sentences. The
departure rates for those receiving sentences were 23.9 percent, with 7.9
percent receiving longer sentences than recommended and 16.1 percent
receiving shorter sentences than recommended.'
The evidence in North Carolina shows that aggravating circumstances
were more commonly found than mitigating circumstances.' In Minnesota
the rates of aggravating and mitigating circumstances were even for imposed
sentences, but mitigating circumstances were more common for executed
In Florida mitigating circumstances were more common.
sentences. 9
Through 1988 in Florida, 14.9 percent of the sentences varied from the
guidelines, with 10.4 percent finding mitigating circumstances and 4.5 percent
finding aggravating circumstances. 9 Two Florida professors indicate that
the imbalance of mitigating and aggravating factors reflects prosecutors
agreeing to sentence reductions in exchange for guilty pleas."9
Evidence on the decrease in sentencing disparity is generally favorable
for reformers. Norval Morris and Michael Tonry report that Minnesota and
Washington state have shown significant decreases in disparities. North
Carolina and California have also shown decreased disparity.' 93
Uniformity in sentencing increased in Minnesota after the guidelines went
into effect in 1978. This uniformity was especially noticeable in the
disposition of offenders sentenced to prison, with a fifty-two percent increase
in uniformity in 1981."9 In 1982 and 1983, sentencing was more uniform
than before the guidelines, but less so than in 1981. In 1982, dispositions
were forty-four percent more uniform than before the guidelines, and in 1983
the percentage was thirty-eight. 9 Durational uniformity was more difficult
to measure in the early days of sentencing guidelines, but evidence in 1983
discloses
an increase in uniformity due to the use of "real time" sentenc96
ing.1
Additional evidence of the increase in uniformity is found by comparing
pre-guideline data with Minnesota's post-guideline departure rate of 6.2
percent. In 1978, state imprisonment practice in Minnesota would have
yielded a dispositional departure rate of 19.4 percent, with twelve percent
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departing upwards and 7.4 percent downward. 97 During the development
of the guidelines, it was determined that a dispositional departure rate greater
than ten percent would probably not meaningfully increase uniformity in
sentencing."1
Thus, the 6.2 percent departure rate indicates increased
uniformity in state imprisonment practices. It is impossible to determine
whether there has been any increase in durational uniformity for executed
sentences because there is no pre-guideline data with which the durations
under the guidelines can be usefully compared. The elimination of parole also
makes this comparison difficult.'
Despite these problems, an attempt was
made to develop comparative data. Due to the difficulties enumerated above,
this data is questionable, but it estimates a pre-guideline departure rate of
thirty-eight percent."
The resulting data indicates a more uniform
sentencing system following sentencing reform in Minnesota.
A study of the guidelines in Maine also showed a reduction in disparity.
The more formalized system of sentencing resulted in less judicial discretion,
which in turn reduced disparity.2 '
In other states the inferences drawn from the daia is less clear. A study
of burglary cases in Florida shows that the guidelines did not reduce sentence
dispaiity, and variation in sentencing remained substantially unchanged after
introduction of the guidelines. 2 A study of Florida's guidelines by two
Florida professors concluded that the guidelines had reduced disparities
between jurisdictions.2 3 This study also revealed that the guidelines were
more lenient on property crimes, especially burglaries, and harsher with
violent offenders. 4 This result may cast some doubt on the study of
burglaries. Evidence on burglary cases in Maryland is more ambiguous. At
most, the guidelines may have resulted in a modest decrease in disparity in
some test cites. 20 5
A second type of disparity that guidelines sought to address was disparity
based on the race, gender, social and economic status of the convicted
felon.2" Some states that have studied the effect of their guidelines have
found that sentencing disparity based on these illegitimate factors decreased,
but did not disappear, after the guidelines were put into place. Yet, other
states have found that sharp racial differences have remained under sentencing
reform.
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An example of decreasing disparity is North Carolina where the
disadvantage to blacks nearly disappeared after sentencing guidelines were
implemented. Before the guidelines, felony sentences of blacks were
estimated to be ninety-two months longer than for whites; after the guidelines,
the difference dropped to nearly nothing. °7 After the guidelines were in
place in Minnesota, the sentences for whites were on average three months
less than for blacks, 37.8 months for whites as compared to 40.8 months for
blacks. 0 8 One problem with the state-wide analysis in Minnesota is that
ninety percent of the blacks are sentenced in two counties, Hennepin and
Ramsey. Within those counties, the differences among the races are even
more startling; in Hennepin, for example, the average sentence is 5.4 months
Native American sentences in
longer for blacks than for whites.2"
Hennepin were 13.3 months longer than sentences for whites.210
Minnesota's study also found that sentences for unemployed defendants
were higher than sentences imposed on those who were employed at the time
of their sentence. The imprisonment rate for employed offenders was 4.9
percent, while for unemployed offenders the rate was 24.4 percent.2 1 '
Eighty percent of black offenders and ninety percent of Native Americans
were unemployed, while only sixty-three percent of whites were unemployed.212 Thus, the employment disparity may actually be the cause of the
racial differences.213 On the issue of gender, Minnesota found
14 that females
received a sentence of 7.6 months less on average than men.
Post-guideline data generally points to an improvement in proportionality.
In developing crime-seriousness scales on which to base the sentencing
guidelines, a state's criminal code must be reviewed. This review would
improve proportionality, even if indeterminate sentencing remained. Sentence
proportionality is achieved by developing crime-seriousness scales and
substantial compliance with the guidelines. Evidence of problems with
proportionality from pre-guideline data is more anecdotal than statistical
because, until crime seriousness scales were developed, proportionality could
not be measured.
Proportionality is not served when a departure is warranted but not made,
or conversely, when a departure is made but not warranted. In Minnesota an
in-depth review of 1728 cases from the eight most populous counties was
completed to determine if substantial and compelling circumstances existed to
support departures."' This analysis showed that in approximately one
percent of the cases a dispositional departure would have been justified and
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would have increased proportionality, but instead, a presumptive disposition
had been imposed.216 Most of these cases were found to warrant aggravated
dispositions. Further, presumptive durations were imposed in approximately
two percent of state imprisonment cases that were deemed to have warranted
durational departures. 2 ' - When dispositional departures were made, twentyeight percent of these departures were judged to be necessary to maintain
proportionality by the researchers studying sentencing decisions. A departure
was not considered essential for the other seventy-two percent. Approximately
half of the aggravated dispositions were deemed to be non-essential for
achieving proportionality, and approximately ninety percent of the mitigations
were judged non-essential to achieve proportionality. 1 8 The above figures
for executed sentences illustrate that fifteen percent of the durational
departures were necessary to achieve proportionality, while the other eightyfive percent were non-essential. 1 9 Approximately seventy percent of the
aggravated departures and approximately ninety percent of the mitigations
were also deemed to be non-essential to achieve proportionality.2" Overall,
this study concludes that in most cases departures were non-essential to
achieve proportionality, but it must be remembered that in some respects
proportionality is a subjective standard and this study only reflects one group
of researchers' views of proportionality.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Many states still have sentencing systems that are a result of piecemeal
legislation that requires different sentencing systems for different offenses.
For example, a state may have a sentencing scheme in which some offenses
have mandatory minimums, others presumptively result in prison sentences,
and others simply provide a broad range for sentences and leave sentencing
decisions to judicial discretion. Reform of this piecemeal system is needed.
Reform would decrease the disparity in sentencing and create uniformity
throughout the state.
Many experts agree that sentencing guidelines are the most promising
type of sentencing reform." Mandatory minimums are inflexible and tie
the hands of judges. Experts report that such laws have no deterrent effect,
induce circumvention by judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys, and
sometimes result in the imposition of unduly harsh sentences on minor
offenders.'
In addition, mandatory minimums shift more discretion from
the parole boards and the judges to the prosecutors,'m while sentencing
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guidelines allow judges to retain some discretion. Mandatory minimums also
lead to large increases in prison populations, 4 but are politically popular
becausethey make the legislators appear to be "tough on crime." Despite their
appeal, they are ineffective and have many negative consequences.
Sentencing guidelines are more promising. They may not be politically
popular and may take more time to develop, but they are a comprehensive
approach to sentencing. In developing guidelines, it is best if the legislature
appoints a commission to develop the guidelines instead of developing them
itself. Commission-developed guidelines tend to be more specific and more
refined than legislatively defined sentences. 5
Developing detailed
guidelines takes a considerable amount of time, and a commission is better
equipped to dedicate the necessary time than a legislative committee, which
deals with many issues. In addition, a commission with representatives of
many groups in the criminal judicial system enables those various representatives to assist in the development of the guidelines. This cooperative
participation may aid in the acceptance of the guidelines by participants in the
justice system and the legislature.
The legislature should provide the commission with specific purposes and
goals that the guidelines are supposed to achieve, so that the purposes are clear
to the public. This propels criminal sentencing decisions out into the open
instead of hiding in the back door with parole boards.
In developing crime seriousness scales, adjustments, specific punishments
and departure standards, commissions must examine all of the impacts which
the guidelines will produce, including the effect on prison population. The
legislature must tell the commission what effect on prison population the state
is willing to accept; for example, whether the state is willing to build new
prisons or whether prison population should remain stable. Guidelines do not
have to result in an increase in prison population if a study of prison
population is pursued and guideline punishments are formulated so that prison
population does not exceed capacity. The difference between this method and
indeterminate sentencing is that under indeterminate sentencing, prison
overcrowding is dealt with by the back door policy of releasing inmates on
parole. Sentencing guidelines create integrity in sentencing by being honest
about the length of a defendant's imprisonment. Some structured discretion
can remain with sentencing guidelines, such as early release if certain
programs are completed or good time credit. Finally, after the guidelines are
developed, further review is necessary to ensure refinements are constructed
to deal with problems and to improve the guidelines.
Sentencing guidelines are often criticized for increasing the resources
necessary to run the criminal justice system. This argument is unfounded.
Sentencing reform forces legislators to be straightforward about how many
resources they want to devote to the criminal justice system and then to devise
guidelines to meet those needs. As this Article has demonstrated, guidelines
can be structured that do not decrease plea bargaining or increase trials but
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rather require the same amount of resources as under indeterminate sentencing.
In determining what resources to devote to the criminal justice system, the
legislature can also determine what resources to devote to matters such as
intermediate sanctions and drug programs.
Finally, it must be remembered that guidelines can create uniformity in
sentencing, but they will not solve all of a state's criminal justice problems.
In Florida, for example, there are many complaints about the guidelines.226
Yet, those complaints are in part due to the large increase in drug crimes,
which have swamped the entire judicial system, including prisons. This
situation has nothing to do with the guidelines, and guidelines will not solve
the problems created by the increasing drug cases. Florida may need more
prosecutors and judges to deal with the influx of drug cases, but guidelines
have no effect on the need for more prosecutors and judges. There is no
evidence that the guidelines in Florida have increased the number of trials,
and, in fact, evidence shows that the guidelines have actually decreased the
number of trials. 7 It is possible that the complex structure of the Florida
guidelines with nine matrices is partially to blame, but restructuring the
guidelines, not getting rid of them all together, may provide the solution. A
second complaint in Florida is that sentences are too short.228 Once again,
the guidelines are not to blame. Guidelines establish a structure in which to
sentence, but the commission or legislature decides what sentences to impose.
If the state wants to increase sentences, simply increasing the guideline
sentences will accomplish this goal. Of course, then the state must deal with
the consequences, such as prison overcrowding.
. Overall, states should take the first step toward criminal sentencing
reform and create a sentencing commission to formulate guidelines.
Sentencing guidelines have proved successful in states that have enacted them,
and the example of these states and the federal courts should be followed.
Guidelines provide the best hope of sentencing reform by increasing
uniformity and proportionality without the negative impacts of mandatory
minimum sentencing.
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